Testing the e¤ects of short-selling restrictions on asset prices is challenging:
INTRODUCTION
This paper studies empirically the impact of short-selling restrictions on asset prices.
Its main contribution is the use of a unique data set on stock lending activity, which contains direct information on the supply curve of the stock-lending market in Brazil.
Stock lending in Brazil is centralized, with lending deals being made directly through an electronic system. When lenders place o¤ers into the system, one can observe actual shifts in the lending supply curve for the securities. This is a crucial component in testing the e¤ects of short-sale restrictions on stock prices.
In general, if an investor wants to short-sell a security, he has to borrow it in advance. Therefore, movements of the stock's lending supply curve are usually taken as a proxy for movements of short-selling restrictions. Based on this idea, a recent literature has been studying the e¤ects of lending supply curve movements on security prices. Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) and Kaplan, Moskowitz, and Sensoy (2011) are important examples.
There are two empirical challenges at the heart of this literature. First, it is hard to observe actual shifts in lending supply. Usually, researchers have historical information related to the equilibrium of the market, that is, fees and quantities of closed deals.
Hence, it is not easy for the econometrician to separate shifts in lending demand from shifts in lending supply and to subsequently estimate their respective e¤ects on stock prices. Second, given the decentralized aspect of the lending markets analyzed in other studies, where loan transactions are usually completed over-the-counter, the available information is often related only to a subset of the overall lending activity of the stocks under analysis.
The present paper contributes to this literature in both of those dimensions. First, with our data set, one can observe actual shifts in the lending supply curves of a number of stocks. Moreover, the data set provides daily information on the entire lending market in Brazil from January 2009 to July 2011. As a result, we can advance the empirical discussion on the e¤ects that short-selling constraints may have on asset prices.
We obtain robust results that support the overpricing hypothesis of .
Miller is the …rst one to theorize that short-sale constraints should lead to overpricing.
According to him, overpricing will occur if both (i) investors are restricted to owning zero shares when they actually want to hold a negative quantity of them, that is, there are short-sale constraints, and (ii) the demand curve of the security is downward sloping, that is, there is divergence of investor opinion about the value of the security. Our empirical results con…rm that conditions (i) and (ii) are both necessary and su¢ cient for overpricing to occur, concordant with prediction.
We regress short-run future returns (1-to 4-week ahead) on actual shifts in lending supply and on a usual proxy for dispersion of opinion, namely, past volatility of returns.
First, we …nd that when lending supply increases, short-run future returns decrease.
Second, we …nd that such an e¤ect depends on the degree of dispersion of opinions.
The higher the volatility of past returns, that is, the greater the dispersion of opinion, the greater the e¤ect of lending supply on prices. Finally, our results indicate that when divergence of opinion is very low, shifts in lending supply curves have no e¤ects on prices.
We observe signi…cant shifts in the lending supply curves over time and across stocks. For many stocks there exist weeks with no lending o¤ers placed into the electronic trading platform, a clear situation of tight short-selling restriction. In other weeks, however, the same stocks present large numbers of lending o¤ers at reasonable rates, that is, low restrictions on short selling. Such a dynamic produces a good environment for the identi…cation of the e¤ects under analysis.
LITERATURE
The study of the e¤ects that short-selling can have on stock markets has been a hot topic among investors, regulators, and researchers. As a reaction to the …nancial crisis From a theoretical perspective, the overpricing hypothesis was controversial for a long period. As mentioned earlier, was the …rst author to predict the overpricing result. Harrison and Kreps (1978) also con…rm that short-sale restrictions along with divergence of opinion should generate overpricing. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) , however, argue that overpricing would not survive in a speci…c environment with rational expectations. According to them, if market participants adjusted their pricing rules to take into account that short-selling restrictions sideline bearish investors, hence assuming complete arbitrage by rational investors, there would be no e¤ect on prices.
This result put the overpricing hypothesis under suspicion for a while. generates disagreements among agents regarding asset fundamentals. Under short-sale constraints, they show that agents pay prices that exceed their own valuation of future dividends because they believe that in the future they will …nd a buyer willing to pay even more, just as in Harrison and Kreps (1978) model. This leads to a signi…cant bubble component in asset prices. The overpricing e¤ect is also produced by the model of Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) under di¤erences of opinion and short-sale constraints.
Empirically, even more than theoretically, the e¤ects of short-sale restrictions have been mixed. According to Kaplan, Moskowitz, and Sensoy (2011) , this should occur because of the challenge of measuring short-sale constraints. Some articles use direct measures of the cost of shorting, such as the loan fee, as a proxy for short-sale constraints (Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002) , Jones and Lamont (2002) , and Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004)). Others (see Desai, et al. (2002) ) use the ratio between the number of shares sold short and the total number of outstanding shares, also known as short interest, to measure short-sale constaints. The problem is that both of these quantities vary with the demand for short-selling. Indeed, loan fees and short interests are determined in equilibrium.
Kaplan, Moskowitz, and Sensoy (2011) address the endogeneity of the usual empirical measures of short-selling restrictions by exogenously increasing the lending supply of some stocks. They perform an experiment increasing the lending supply using stocks owned by a large money manager. They …nd that returns to stocks randomly made available for lending are no di¤erent from those randomly withheld during the lending or recall periods. They also …nd no di¤erences in volatility, bid-ask spread, or skewness changes for stocks randomly lent versus withheld.
Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) use private data on both loan fees and short interests for some stocks to separately identify shifts to shorting demand and shorting supply. They proceed as follows. For a given security, in months when the average loan fee decreased but the total loan quantity increased compared to the previous month, they say that the lending supply must have shifted to the right. On the other hand, when the average loan fee increased but the loan quantity decreased, the lending supply must have shifted to the left. Using this strategy, they construct dummy variables that track tightening and loosening movements in the short-selling restriction for each An issue with the regressions in Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) is that their method is able to identify only a small part of the supply shifts that may have occurred during their sample period. For example, if both supply and demand shifted to the right in a given month with a larger shift in demand, they would observe higher loan fee and quantity and, hence, would not identify the shift of the loan supply at all.
Besides, their strategy does not di¤erentiate between large and small shifts in lending supply, which can be a problem if the e¤ects are increasing with the size of the shifts.
Our baseline analysis uses panel data regression to determine, for a given security, the e¤ect of a shift in its lending supply curve in predicting its short-run return (1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-week ahead). This is in the same method used by Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) . However, our regressions di¤er from theirs because our unique data set allows us to use actual shifts in the lending supply curve of each security to predict returns (instead of their dummy variables).
Our results in favor of the overpricing hypothesis are consistent with a number of previous empirical studies. Aitken However, all the works in the previous paragraph use as proxies for short-selling restrictions variables that are not purely related to short-selling supply and can be a¤ected by the demand side of the lending market. Since we use actual shifts in the lending supply curve on the right-hand side of our regressions in the present paper, we produce a relevant contribution to this branch of literature.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 describes the Brazilian stock lending market and presents our data set. Section 3 develops the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
STOCK LENDING IN BRAZIL
In this section, we present information relevant to the securities lending market in Brazil. We chose Brazilian data due to its unique market microstructure: all lending transactions are centralized and cleared through the Brazilian Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA) 1 .
A centralized facility for securities lending transactions o¤ers a unique environment for testing the e¤ects of short selling restrictions, as we discuss below.
Regulation of the securities lending market in Brazil is determined by the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) and by the Brazilian Monetary Council (CMN). All transactions are mediated by BM&FBOVESPA's brokers which are responsible for bringing together opposite interests in the market place -stocks'borrowers and lenders.
1 BM&FBOVESPA is the fourth largest exchange in the word in terms of market capitalization.
This exchange has a vertically integrated business model with a trade platform and clearing for equities, derivatives and cash market for currency, government and private bonds.
Any security listed on the exchange is eligible for lending.
The stock lending market in Brazil has become increasingly strong over the last 10 years, as reported in Table 1 . Lending securities currently is a common practice among Brazilian market participants. In 2011, more than US$ 400 billion in stocks were lent in more than 1.4 million deals, representing about one-third of market capitalization of about US$ 1.2 trillion. These transactions involved an average of 290 companies per month. In that same year, the lenders were individuals in 40%, foreign investors in 35%, and mutual funds in 25% of the deals. On the borrowing side, 70% of transactions were with mutual funds, 25% with foreign investors, and 5% with individuals.
[ Table 1 about here]
BM&FBOVESPA provides a platform where brokers can register o¤ers from their clients directly through an electronic system called BTC. Lenders place shares for loan directly into the system, where borrowers can electronically hit the o¤ers. Even though it is also possible for borrowers to place loan bids into the system, this is not usual.
More than 99% of the o¤ers placed into BTC come from lenders.
Additionally, BTC allows cross-orders, where both sides are simultaneously inserted into the system by the same broker. These are transactions that were closed in advance on the over-the-counter market. To comply with Brazilian regulations, brokers must enter all deals of this kind into BTC, identifying the parties, the lending fee and amount, and all other relevant information of the deal.
In sum, securities lending transactions can be executed either through borrowers hitting lenders'orders on the screen, or as result of over-the-counter transaction, which according to Brazilian regulation must be cleared by BM&FBOVESPA. In either case, the BTC saves the information for every deal. As a result, the BTC data set contains historical (order by order) information on the entire securities lending market in Brazil on a daily frequency.
Notice, however, that the saved information related to the over-the-counter market is distinct in a crucial dimension from the saved information related to the electronic market. If a deal is closed over-the-counter, the broker saves into the system only the information related to the equilibrium of the market, that is, fees and quantities of closed deals (where supply and demand agreed with each other). Instead, when lenders place shares for loan directly into the system, the BTC saves the clean information related to the supply side of the market.
With the information contained in the BTC, it is possible to see how often a given stock is negotiated over-the-counter vis-à-vis electronically. Considering the period from January 2009 to July 2011, Figure 1 presents, stock by stock, the ratio between the volume of loans negotiated over-the-counter and the total volume (the sum of the volume negotiated over-the-counter and the volume electronically negotiated through BTC). The y-axis then indicates the importance of the over-the-counter market for the lending operations of a given stock. Any stock that had one or more lending o¤ers during the period is reported in Figure 1 .
[ Figure 1 about here]
Given that, for the securities with the y-axis equal to 1 in Figure 1 , the BTC has no direct information related to their loan supply, since their loans are always negotiated over-the-counter and all that is recorded are quantities and prices of equilibrium. For all other securities, at least some information on the actual lending supply is recorded by system. Importantly, a larger portion of the supply side of a security's lending market can be observed as the y-axis value of the security decreases.
We claim that if a stock is located below the 30%-dashed line in Figure 1 , we observe a signi…cant part of the supply side of its lending market. Indeed, for such stocks, more than 70% of the lending deals (in volume) occur through the electronic system. There are 273 stocks in this group. However, many of these stocks are not suitable for our empirical purpose. Crucially, we want to work with securities that are traded with a reasonable frequency. Hence, we focus our analysis on stocks below the 30% line traded at least once a week from January 2009 to July 2011. We denote this group of stocks by "LEL (liquid and electronically lent) group". The number of stocks in the LEL group is 44 and they are listed in Table 2 . How are the stocks in the LEL group di¤erent from the liquid stocks that are mostly borrowed and lent in the over-the-counter market? To investigate this, we create the "LLOTC (liquid and lent over-the-counter) group", which contains the stocks that are located above the 70% horizontal dashed line in Figure 1 and were traded at least once a week during the study interval. There are 113 stocks in this group. We then compare the LEL and LLOTC groups by (i) size of the …rms, (ii) two measures of liquidity, (iii) the proportion of the number of shares o¤ered for lending to the number of outstanding shares, and (iv) lending rate. We compute these measures for each month of the studied period. Size is computed as the group average market capitalization (in millions of US$) of the …rms in each month. The …rst measure of liquidity is the monthly average of the daily ratio between the number of stocks that were negotiated on that day and the number of stocks in the group. It indicates the proportion of the stocks in each group that are traded every day, on average. The second measure of liquidity is the average, in each group, of the stocks'monthly traded volume relative to their market capitalization. Even though two stocks may trade everyday, which is indicated by the …rst measure, one of the stocks may trade on average a larger proportion of its market capitalization, which is captured by the second measure. The proportion of the number of shares o¤ered for lending to the number of outstanding shares is a measure of the size of the lending market for the stocks in each group. Finally, the lending rate is the group weighted average of the lending rates, that is, the rate of each order weighted by the size of the order in terms of number of shares. Table 3 reports the results.
[ Table 3 about here]
According to Table 3 , the LEL group is composed of smaller …rms. In this group, the average size of a …rm is US$ 583 million. In the LLOTC group, it is US$ 7.7 billion.
It makes sense that the over-the-counter lending market concentrates its operations on larger …rms, since these should generate higher lending volumes, and hence higher brokerage fees. This idea is corroborated by the fact that the lending market for the LEL group, the volume of o¤ers in proportion to outstanding shares, is on average half the size as for the LLOTC group (0.58% and 1.32%, respectively). With respect to the average lending rates, the stocks in the LEL group are o¤ered at 6.3% (per annum) on average, and the average rate for the LLOTC group is 1.9%. This di¤erence also 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our goal is to determine, for a given security, the e¤ect of a shift of its lending supply curve in predicting its short-run future return (1-, 2-, 3-and 4-week ahead). Since investors have to borrow the securities in order short-sell them, shifts to the left in the lending supply curve are related to tighter restrictions for short-selling. We test two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): An increase in the lending supply, that is, less restriction for short-selling, predicts negative returns in the next 1 to 4 weeks.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The higher the dispersion of opinion about the value of the stock, the stronger the e¤ect described in H1. Moreover, if the dispersion of opinion is su¢ ciently low, the e¤ect described in H1 disappears.
These are the same hypotheses tested by Boheme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) and First, in our estimations we use actual shifts of the lending supply curve on the righthand side of our model, instead of dummies variables as they do. The shifts go in both directions of increasing and decreasing the supply curve of lending. Second, we interact the shifts of the lending supply curve with a measure of dispersion of opinion.
With weekly observations, we estimate r i;t+h = 1 q i;t + 2 disp i;t + 3 q i;t disp i;t + 4 r i;t + t + i + " i;t+h ;
where h = 1; 2; 3; and 4; and r i;t+h represents the risk-adjusted return of stock i for the period between week t + 1 and week t + h (inclusive). We compute the risk-adjusted returns as in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007), subtracting from the stock return the return on the size/book-to-market matched portfolio. 4 The explanatory variables in equation (1) are q i;t : the number of shares o¤ered for lending in week t relative to the number of shares outstanding for stock i: The number of shares o¤ered for lending in week t is given by the sum of the daily lending o¤ers that are placed in the electronic system with "reasonable" lending rates. That is, lending o¤ers that ask for "high" lending rates are not included in q i;t . As in the previous section, we de…ne "high" lending rates on a stock-by-stock basis, by ranking the o¤ers within each stock according to their rates and excluding those in the highest quintile.
As a robustness check, we later run the same regression excluding the highest tercile instead. We control regression (1) for r i;t because shifts of the lending supply curve in week t may, in part, be correlated with the stock return in that same week. For instance, lenders may be encouraged to lend when stock prices are increasing. Hence, because of possible momentum and reversal e¤ects, omitting r i;t could bias the estimation. Given the panel structure of the data, we can control the regression for common shocks across stocks through t ; and for possible individual …xed-e¤ects through i .
In terms of the parameters in model (1) Table 4 reports results from the estimation of model (1). We …rst use the 44 stocks (30% threshold) of the LEL group. The period is January 2009 to July 2011.
RESULTS
[ Table 4 about here] Indeed, a lending o¤er can remain active in the electronic system for a number of days, until it is totally hit (the expiration of the o¤er is de…ned by the lender at the moment he places it on the screen).
The sample average of q t is 0:099%, while the sample maximum value is 4:8%: Hence, according to column 1, an average-size increase in the lending supply would generate a decrease in the stock price in the following week with magnitude of 0:406 0:099% = 0:04%: The price decrease in the following 4 weeks, according to column 7, would be equal to 1:473 0:099% = 0:15%:
The unrestricted estimates, which test H2, are presented in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8.
According to columns 2, 6 and 8 the negative e¤ect of q t on returns will only occur if The evidence in Table 4 strongly supports both H1 and H2. However, it is important to check the robustness of the results. We …rst re-estimate equation (1) computing q t using an alternative de…nition for "high" lending rates. Instead of ranking the o¤ers within each stock according to their rates and excluding the ones in the highest quintile, we now exclude the ones in the highest tercile. By doing so, we are excluding additional lending o¤ers with higher lending rates. Table 5 presents the results.
[ Table 5 about here]
As before, columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 present the restricted estimates by imposing increase in the lending supply would generate a decrease in stock prices in the following week by a magnitude of 0:407 0:099% = 0:04%: The price decrease in the following 4 weeks, according to column 7, would be equal to 1:242 0:099% = 0:12%: The …gures are similar to those we obtained before.
To test H2 we turn to columns 2, 4, 6, and 8. The conclusion goes in the same direction as before. Negative e¤ects of q t on short-run returns will only occur when the dispersion of opinion (disp t ) is not too low. According to column 2, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a negative e¤ect of q t on returns is disp t > 0: For columns 4, 6, and 8, respectively, a higher q t will depress prices if and only if disp t is higher than 0:019; 0:018 and 0:017: As mentioned before, those are low values for disp t ; about the 10th percentile of its distribution, since the sample average of disp t is 0:038. Tables 4 and 5 were estimated using the 44 stocks of LEL group, that is, the stocks below the 30%-line in Figure 1 which, from January 2009 to July 2011, were traded at least once a week. The 30%-line indicates that 30% of the lending deals (in volume)
are made over-the-counter or, in other words, that we observe the lending supply curve of a stock over the 30%-line for 70% of its lending deals. We could be more restrictive with respect to such a parameter and estimate model (1) using only the stocks that, for instance, more than 85% of the lent volume are closed through the electronic system.
In this case, we would use the stocks below a 15% threshold in Figure 1 which were traded every week. There are 29 stocks that meet such a criterion. For these stocks, we can certainly observe a very signi…cant part of their supply curves. Table 6 presents the results of model (1) using these 29 stocks, computing q t by ranking the o¤ers for each stock according to their rates and excluding the ones in the highest quintile.
[ Table 6 about here]
The results are fairly robust. According to columns 1, 3, 5, and 7, hypothesis H1 holds empirically. The 1-week ahead e¤ect on the risk-adjusted return of an averagesized increase in the lending supply is 0:413 0:099% = 0:04%: For the 4-week forecast, the e¤ect is 1:685 0:099% = 0:17%: Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 are once again consistent with H2. Column 2, 6, and 8 indicate that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a negative e¤ect of q t on returns is disp t > 0: According to column 4, a higher q t will depress prices if and only if disp t is higher than 0:018:
Finally, in Tables 7, 8 and 9, we reproduce Tables 4, 5 and 6, respectively, using raw returns on the left-hand side of (1) instead of risk-adjusted returns. The results still con…rm H1 and H2, although the e¤ects are slightly smaller.
[ Tables 7, 8 , and 9 about here]
In columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Table 7 (which uses the 44 stocks of the LEL group and the highest-quintile rule for q t ); we see strong evidence in favor of H1. However, the e¤ects of q t on non-risk-adjusted returns are slightly smaller. According to column 1, an average-sized increase in the lending supply would generate a decrease in the stock price in the following week equal to 0:269 0:099% = 0:03%: The price decrease in the following 4 weeks, according to column 7, would be equal to 1:002 0:099% = 0:09%:
Although 3 is not statistically signi…cant in column 2, H2 continues to be supported by results in columns 4, 6, and 8. Columns 6 and 8 indicate that a negative e¤ect of q t on returns will occur if and only if disp t > 0. According to column 4, a higher q t will depress prices if and only if disp t is higher than 0:018: Tables 8 and 9 produce very similar results.
Importantly, the lending supply shifts that we observe are not exogenously determined and the econometrician cannot observe the information set available to the stock lender at the moment he decides how many stocks he will o¤er for loan. However, the decision mechanism of stock lenders is clear. It is reasonable to assume that lenders increase the amount they wish to lend when they think the stock will perform well in the near future. Analogously, they lend less when they expect low returns. Hence, the unobservable variables in the lender's information set that are in the error term of the regressions, that is, the ones that are related to short-run future returns, should positively correlate with shifts in lending supply. Therefore, the estimated negative e¤ects of stock lending supply on short-run future returns should possibly be taken as a lower bound for the populational values in absolute terms.
CONCLUSION
The study of the e¤ects that short-selling can have on stock markets has been a hot topic among investors, regulators, and researchers. As a reaction to the …nancial crisis To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst study that uses empirical data that contain actual shifts in the supply curve of the lending market. Indeed, our data set permits the direct daily observation of lending o¤ers for a number of stocks, thanks to the centralized lending electronic system run by BM&FBOVESPA. Moreover, the stock lending supply curves that we observe su¤er considerable variations over time and cross-sectionally. In particular, there are periods with no new lending o¤er. Such variations are ideal to test theories on short-selling restriction and make our tests rather reliable.
We test two hypotheses, namely, (i) short-selling restrictions causes stock overpricing, and (ii) such e¤ect is increasing in the dispersion of opinion among investors. The hypotheses are in line with a number of theoretical models such as Table 2 : List of …rms in the LEL group, that is, the liquid …rms (negotiated at least once a week) which are mostly lent in the electronic market (that is, located below the 30% horizontal line in Figure 1 6.31% 1.91% The LEL (LLOTC) group contains the stocks that have more than 70% of their lending deals, in volume, negotiated in the eletronic (over-the-counter) market. Both groups contain only liquid stocks (stocks that were negotiated at least once a week). The period of analysis is January 2009 to July 2011. "Size" is the group average market capitalization of the firms (in millions of US$); "liquidity 1" is the monthly average of the daily ratio between the number of stocks that were negotiated on that day and the number of stocks in the group; "liquidity 2" is the montly average of the number of shares traded relative to the number of shares outstanding; "lending market size" is the group average of the ratio between the number of shares offered for lending in that month for a given stock and its number of shares outstanding; "lending rate" is the group weighted average of the lending rates (the rate of each order is weighted by the size of the order in terms of number of shares). size liquidity 1 lending market size lending rate liquidity 2 BAZA3  BEES3  BMIN4  BMTO4   CBMA4  CCIM3  CMIG3  COCE5   CTNM4  EMAE4  EZTC3  FHER3   FJTA4  FRAS4  GPCP3  GPIV11   GRND3  HBOR3  HETA4  IENG3   IENG5  INEP3  INET3  ITSA3 # shares offered for lending / # shares outstanding (%) week Graphs by ticker To compute q t , we do not consider the lending offers with high lending rates. These are defined in a stock by stock basis: for each stock we rank the lending offers according to their rates and divide them in 5 quantiles; the offers in the last quantile (the ones with the highest rates) are then dropped for each stock. (II) disp To compute q t , we do not consider the lending offers with high lending rates. These are defined in a stock by stock basis: for each stock we rank the lending offers according to their rates and divide them into 3 quantiles; the offers in the last quantile (the ones with the highest rates) are then dropped for each stock. (II) disp t , a proxy for the dispersion of investors opinion on the stock valuation, which is computed as the variance of daily returns during the last 50 days of trading. (IV) q 
